Political geography has long played a prominent role in conceptions of political realignments. In this paper, I apply a spatial analysis to examine the political geography of Geographically Weighted Regressions demonstrate that this localized political geography was shaped by extensive geographic variation in how political and demographic factors influenced voting behavior across the United States.
Introduction
Political geography has long played a prominent role in conceptions of political realignments.
Locations such as industrial cities (Andersen 1979) , immigrant towns (Key 1955) , urban counties (Burnham 1970) , and rural anti-slavery locales (Sundquist 1983 ) have figured prominently in realignment studies, as scholars have sought to determine where changes in voting behavior have been located. These studies are premised on the recognition that geography conditions citizens' responses to political crises and emergent issues during realignments. In short, because realignments are geographically structured, subnational phenomena (Nardulli 1995) , realignment scholars have been keenly interested in determining where voting changes have occurred along with why these changes have occurred.
This paper engages these two central questions regarding realignments. It does so by applying a spatial analysis to changes in voting behavior during the [1928] [1929] [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] [1934] [1935] [1936] period that ushered in the New Deal party system. Although spatial analyses have been applied to a variety of questions in political science (Gleditsch and Ward 2000; Cho 2003; Gimpel and Cho 2004; Darmofal 2006) , they have been less applied to political realignments. This is unfortunate, because as local-level phenomena exhibiting significant geographic variation, political realignments are ideal subjects for the application of spatial analytic approaches. The spatial methods employed in this paper allow me to identify the areas of the country that changed their voting behavior during the New Deal realignment and to identify how the varying effects of political and demographic factors across the United States shaped the political geography of voting during this realignment.
The spatial analysis challenges some of our common conceptions of the New Deal era realignment.
1 For example, increased support for the Democrats and Al Smith in 1928 was not concentrated in urban locales. Instead, Smith benefitted from a widespread increase in Democratic support in the largely rural Upper Plains and Mountain states. In the 1932 election, higher rates of unemployment impeded shifts toward Franklin Roosevelt and the Democrats.
The spatial analysis demonstrates that changes in voter support during this period were subnational and localized, consistent with the political geographic perspective on realignments.
This localized political geography argues that political and demographic factors may have had disparate effects on voting behavior in different geographic locations. This is to be expected in a polity as diverse as the United States. I employ Geographically Weighted Regressions to model this spatial nonstationarity, this geographic variation in the effects of variables on voting behavior during the New Deal realignment. Geographically weighted regessions differ from standard modeling approaches because they estimate separate regression coefficients and standard errors for each observation in the data and thus allow variables to vary in their effects geographically. The Geographically Weighted Regression estimates confirm that the spatially varying effects of prior voting behavior and demographics played critical roles in producing the political geography of the New Deal realignment.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I examine the role of political geography during political realignments. Next, I employ global and local measures of spatial autocorrelation to identify the political geography of movements toward and away from the Democratic Party in 1928, 1932, and 1936 . In the following sections, I employ Geographically Weighted Regressions to model the geographically varying sources of changes in voting behavior during this period. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of the analysis for our understanding of political realignments.
Political Geography and Realignments
Although most studies of voting behavior employ individual-level survey data, political realignments have long been conceptualized as macro-level phenomena. Indeed, as much as any other subject in political behavior, the study of political realignments has been dominated by the study of aggregate units. The earliest studies of realignments, exemplified by Key's (1955 Key's ( , 1959 two classic studies of critical and secular electoral change, focused on the identification of representative areal units that could be used to locate aggregate changes in voting behavior.
For Key, these areal units primarily were towns in New England.
Although the focus on selected aggregate units (see also Burnham 1965 Burnham , 1970 ) reflected then-existing limitations of data availability, scholars of the era employed conscious strategies in choosing aggregate units. Believing that realignments constituted natural experiments, scholars identified aggregate units likely to experience the political treatment -economic depression, distinct policy concerns, ethnoreligious appeals -and those unlikely to experience the treatment and examined how subsequent voting differed in the two sets of aggregate units. Subsequent scholars, aided by greater data availability, have employed this same natural experiment perspective in seeking to pinpoint where voting changes occurred -for example, in urban locales featuring large pools of non-immunized immigrants (Andersen 1979) .
Political geography has, in short, played a central role in the study of political realignments.
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In perhaps the most extensive geographic analysis of realignments, Nardulli (1995) demonstrates the utility of and need for a geographic approach in the study of realignments. Employing data on 215 substate regions covering the continental United States, Nardulli empirically confirms the assumptions of previous political geographic studies of realignments. Realignments are not national phenomena. Instead, they are localized, subnational phenomena, with changes in voting behavior concentrated in particular geographic locations. As a consequence, identifying where voting changes have occurred during realignments can aid considerably in understanding why they have occurred. Nardulli (1995, 11) succinctly summarizes this perspective:
"Equally important for the detection and measurement of realignments are spatial considerations. It is unrealistic to expect the entire U.S. electorate to respond simultaneously and uniformly to the type of stimuli that will generate a critical realignment in electoral patterns. There is simply too much geopolitical diversity in the United States to justify such an expectation."
2 I define political geography as the relationship between units' spatial locations and their political behaviors, processes, and events. This definition recognizes that geography plays critical roles in conditioning a broad range of political phenomena. These roles include both the promotion of opportunities for diffusion between neighboring units (e.g., Starr and Most 1978; Siverson and Starr 1990 ) and the clustering of common attributes among neighboring units (e.g., Darmofal 2006) . Brown (1988 Brown ( , 1991 by applying these methods I am able to determine whether there was a spatial structure to these changes in voting behavior, as predicted by the political geographic perspective, or whether the changes were spatially random. I am also able to identify where spatial patterns in movements toward and away from the Democratic Party were located. Finally, by employing Geographically Weighted Regressions, I am able to identify how the geographic diversity in the effects of political and demographic factors shaped the political geography of the New Deal realignment.
Global and Local Measures of Spatial Autocorrelation
Spatial autocorrelation exists if increases or decreases in Democratic support exhibit spatial clustering at "neighboring" locations. 4 Positive spatial autocorrelation exists if neighboring electorates exhibit similar behavior (e.g., similar shifts toward the Democratic Party) while negative spatial autocorrelation exists if neighboring electorates exhibit dissimilar behavior (e.g., dissimilar shifts toward and away from the Democratic Party). Formally, spatial autocorrela-tion implies a non-zero covariance on a random variable at neighboring locations (Anselin and Bera 1998, 241-242 Anselin (1995, 105-6) , 1924-1928, 1928-1932, and 1932-1936) . The focus on changes in the voting age population's vote, rather than changes in the proportion of the actual vote cast, reflects Andersen's (1979) recognition that changes in support for a party may come not from the conversion of the opposing party's supporters, but rather from the mobilization of non-voters. By employing the voting age population as the denominator rather than votes cast we are able to examine the factors that produced shifts in behavior among both voters and non-voters. The data employed in this analysis are a subset of a county-level and state-level archive collected by Peter F. Nardulli and a team of scholars at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The data include political, electoral, and demographic measures and include observations on all counties in the continental United States for each presidential election from 1828 to the present. A full description of the data is provided in Nardulli (2005) .
there was little change in aggregate voting behavior, with Democrats registering a negligible loss of 0.2 percentage points.
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Were the changes in voter support in the 1920s and 1930s randomly distributed across the country? Or, as predicted by the political geographic perspective on realignments, were there spatial patterns to these changes in support? The global Morans tell a clear story:
there was a strong spatial patterning to voting changes across each of these elections. The changes in the Democratic vote between 1924 Democratic vote between and 1928 Democratic vote between , 1928 Democratic vote between and 1932 Democratic vote between , and 1932 Democratic vote between and 1936 each exhibit significant positive global spatial autocorrelation (p < .01). distinct from each other. In each of these three elections, the positively spatially autocorrelated counties above the mean exhibited significantly larger shifts toward the Democratic Party than did the positively autocorrelated counties below the mean (p < .0001, one-tailed test, for all three elections). The differences in the means between the other groups were significant at a p < .005 level, one-tailed test, with only one exception (the 1928 comparison between cases that were not significant and those that were negatively autocorrelated below the mean with neighbors above the mean).
It is important also to note that the local Morans and the corresponding patterns shown in Figure 1 are not a function of the greater susceptibility of less populated counties to larger aggregate voting changes. In both 1928 and 1936, correlations between the absolute value of change in Democratic support and county population were positive and statistically significant, using either the voting age population or the total population as the measure of the county's population (p < .0001 in both elections). These positive correlations indicate that changes in Democratic support were larger in more populated counties than in less populated counties. How strong were these shifts toward Smith and the Democrats? While the overall mean shift toward the Democrats in the election was 4.4 percentage points among the voting age population, the mean shift in positively autocorrelated counties above the mean was 18.3 points.
In contrast, in the positively autocorrelated counties below the mean, there was a mean loss of support for the Democrats of 5.5 points. Overall, the maps in Figure 1 demonstrate the strong spatial patterning of voting during the New Deal realignment. As predicted by the realignment literature, movements toward and away from the Democratic Party during this period were not spatially random. Instead, the local spatial autocorrelation results demonstrate that there was a significant local spatial structuring to changes in voting behavior. The local nature of these spatial patterns suggests possible significant spatial nonstationarity in the sources of aggregate voting change during this period. Shifts in aggregate voter support from election to election were also quite complex, with the parties rarely registering similar increases or decreases in support in the same counties in succeeding elections. This argues for the utility of examining these three elections separately.
The next section turns to spatial modeling of the changes in voter support during these elections.
Geographically Weighted Regression
One of the defining features of the American polity is its geopolitical diversity (see, e.g., Gimpel and Schuknecht 2003) . In a geographically expansive polity that has been marked by localism and sectionalism, we should not, a priori, expect political and demographic factors to play the same roles in shaping behavior in all areas of the country. Instead, they are likely to vary geographically in their effects on political behaviors, producing geographic diversity in these behaviors. The political geography of the New Deal realignment reflects this diversity and suggests that the factors shaping voting behavior during this period may have varied geographically in their effects.
We need, therefore, a strategy for modeling spatial heterogeneity, or spatial nonstationarity, in the sources of voting behavior during the New Deal realignment. Spatial regimes models (see, e.g., Anselin 1990) offer one possibility, but are limited in their capacity for modeling multiple localized geographic patterns of voting behavior. What is needed, instead, is a more localized approach such as Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR) (Fotheringham, Charlton, and Brunsdon 1998; Fotheringham, Brunsdon, and Charlton 2002) that will allow the effects of variables to vary for each unit in the data.
In the standard regression approach, the effects of variables are estimated as global parameters that are not allowed to vary by unit.
11 The result is the standard regression model with non-varying parameters:
GWR departs from this standard regression framework by allowing the estimated parameters to vary geographically. The result is a continuous spatial plane of parameter values, with these parameters measured at particular observed locations, typically the centroids of the observed units (in this paper's analysis, the parameters are measured at the centroid of each county with observed data) Brunsdon 1998, 1907) . The result is the following model with spatially varying parameters:
where, as Fotheringham, Brunsdon, and Charlton (2002, 52) note, "u i , v i denotes the coordinates of the i th point in space and β k (u i , v i ) is a realization of the continuous function β k (u, v) at point i."
In calibrating equation (2), locations near i are given greater weight in influencing
through a spatial weights matrix. Here, a Gaussian weighting function is often employed (and is employed in this paper's analysis). The Gaussian weighting function takes the form:
where d ij is the distance between points i and j and b is the bandwidth. The bandwidth reflects the distance-decay of the weighting function and affects the spatial smoothing of the estimates, with smaller bandwidths producing less spatial smoothing than larger bandwidths (Fotheringham, Brunsdon, and Charlton 2002, 45) . In this analysis, I estimate the appropriate bandwidths through a cross-validation approach for local regression that employs the fitted values for locations near point i while excluding i itself (see Cleveland 1979 , Fotheringham, Charlton, and Brunsdon 1998 , 1910 . Non-Voting t−1 (the proportion of the county's voting age population that did not vote in the prior presidential election) in the GWR models. Because of the competing effects of raw pools of voters and inertia already discussed, these variables do not present directional expectations.
In addition to these main effects, it is also important to examine how social interactions between citizens and how local partisan contexts may have shaped changes in party support (Brown 1988 (Brown , 1991 . For example, it may be that the movement of non-voters into the De-mocratic camp was made more likely by the existence of a large population of pre-existing Democratic voters in the county. Conversely, perhaps the reason that non-voters previously chose not to participate was because they were opposed to a locally dominant Democratic party. If so, the presence of a large local Democratic constituency could serve to impede the mobilization of non-voters into support for the party's presidential candidate. These interactive effects, it is important to note, may occur either due to direct interpersonal interactions between citizens or because of the contextual presence of partisan populations even where there were no interpersonal interactions between Democratic and non-voting populations. In short, these effects are consistent either with contact or context and it is impossible from the available aggregate data to determine which is the mechanism at work.
To examine the possible effects of social interactions and context on voting, it is important to include interaction terms of prior partisan and non-voting populations in the GWR models. These interaction terms, for the reasons previously stated, do not present directional expectations. To capture social interaction and contextual effects within counties, I include three interaction terms in the models: P roportion Democratic t−1 x P roportion Republican t−1 , In examining the aggregate effects of these variables, we must be sensitive to the ecological inference problem. We cannot assume that foreign-born and Catholic populations translated, The third demographic variable is Population Change, which measures the county-level population change between elections (in ten thousands). Population change can engender voting change by introducing a dynamic element into existing partisan social networks. Alternatively, it may impede voting change by weakening the social network connections that promote voter mobilization.
P roportion Democratic

The Sources of Changes in Aggregate Democratic Voting During the New Deal Realignment
To examine spatial nonstationarity in the effects of the political and demographic variables, I conducted preliminary tests of spatial nonstationarity for each of the variables in the Geographically Weighted Regression models. 13 With one exception, all of the variables evidenced significant spatial nonstationarity in the three elections at a p < .001 level (the one exception was the P roportion Democratic t−1 x P roportion Non-Voting t−1 interaction in 1936). This preliminary evidence of spatial nonstationarity argues that a Geographically Weighted Regression analyis is warranted. 1924 and 1928, 1928 and 1932, and 1932 and 1936 . The first five columns in the table report, respectively, the minimum coefficient for the variable, the coefficient at the 25th percentile of the distribution, the median coefficient, the coefficient at the 75th percentile, and the maximum coefficient. The sixth column reports the coefficient for a standard model with global, non-varying coefficients. The seventh column reports the percentage of observations with significant positive coefficients at a p < .05 level for all variables other than P roportion Democratic t−1 (which had a one-tailed test). The eighth column reports, for all variables, the percentage of observations with significant negative coefficients at a p < .05 level.
The dependent variable in each model is Democratic Change. Reported below each model are the number of observations and the mean R 2 for the counties in the data. The Geographically Weighted Regressions are weighted by county-level voting age population. Table 2 demonstrates the extensive geographic variation in the effects of the political and demographic variables. The minimum and maximum coefficients have different signs for each variable in each of the three elections examined. For many variables, this is also the case 13 These spatial nonstationarity tests were conducted using the gwr command in Stata. Some caution is warranted in interpreting these results because the gwr command does not accept weights, unlike the spgwr package in R that is used for the Geographically Weighted Regressions presented in this paper. As a consequence, unlike the GWR analyses presented in Table 2 of this paper, which are weighted by the county-level voting age population, these initial spatial nonstationarity tests are based on unweighted regressions. The spgwr package does not include tests for spatial nonstationarity.
for the interquartile range of coefficient values. Given this extensive geographic variation, standard global parameter estimates do not accurately capture the local effects of the political and demographic variables. This is reflected in the significance tests reported in the final two columns of the table. There are large percentages of both significant positive and negative effects for most variables in these elections.
14 Examining first the changes in aggregate Democratic support between 1924 and 1928, we can see in Table 2 The effects become more mixed when we look at the interactions between the variables measuring prior partisan and non-voting behavior. In most counties in 1928, the interaction term, P roportion Democratic t−1 x P roportion Republican t−1 , had a negative effect on changes in Democratic support in 1928. However, in more than a quarter of counties, the effect of this interaction term was positive. In more than half of counties, the interaction term, P roportion Democratic t−1 x P roportion Non-Voting t−1 , reduced shifts to the Democrats in 1928, but in more than 30 percent of counties this interaction had a positive effect. In more than 60 percent of counties, the interaction term, P roportion Republican t−1 x P roportion Non-Voting t−1 , had 14 The large negative minimum values on P roportion Democratic t−1 , P roportion Republican t−1 , and P roportion Non-Voting t−1 in 1936 reflect Dade County, Florida. One other county, Monroe County, Florida was also a large negative outlier in this election, with values on these variables of -21.098, -21.338, and -20.971 (the next closest values on these three variables were, respectively, -7.577, -8.247, and -7.034). In a data set with so many observations, the inclusion of these two outliers in the data had little effect on the results. For example, an analysis excluding Dade and Monroe counties produced median values on P roportion Democratic t−1 , P roportion Republican t−1 , and P roportion Non-Voting t−1 of -1.134, -1.001, and -.830, little changed from the values in Table 2 . Similarly, the global estimates for these same three variables were -1.764, -1.890, and -1.406, nearly identical to those in Table 2 . Maps of the GWR coefficients were virtually identical with and without the two outliers included as well. Given this, I included the two outlier cases in the analysis. a negative effect on changes in Democratic support, but in nearly 20 percent of counties this interaction promoted shifts toward the Democrats. Thus, while the joint presence of prior partisan and non-voting populations further impeded movements toward the Democrats in most locales, the coexistence of these populations served also to promote movement toward the Democrats in a sizable percentage of counties, whether through direct interpersonal interactions or through contextual effects. The upper left map in figure 2 plots the GWR coefficients for P roportion Democratic t−1 , the upper right map plots the GWR coefficients for P roportion Republican t−1 , and the lower left map plots the GWR coefficients for the interaction term, P roportion Democratic t−1 x P roportion Republican t−1 . In each map, counties with significant GWR coefficients (at a p < .05 level) are plotted in four shades of gray, with the effects of the variables on Democratic Change becoming more negative as the shades of gray become lighter. In each map, counties with insignificant GWR coefficients are plotted in white.
As can be seen, geographic variation in the main effect of P roportion Democratic t−1 had only a slight correspondence to the local spatial autocorrelation in Democratic Change in 1928.
Less negative effects of prior Democratic support in portions of Wisconsin, Minnesota, and New York played a role in shaping the political geography of voting in 1928 in these areas, but overall, the main effect of P roportion Democratic t−1 on this political geography was likely more one traceable to values on this variable than geographic variations in the effects of the variable.
In contrast, some of the Western shift toward the Democrats in 1928 can be traced to the larger positive effects of P roportion Republican t−1 on Democratic Change in these locales in 1928.
Similarly, the interaction of prior Democratic and Republican support had a larger positive effect on Democratic change in the mountain region than in some other locales in this election. Clearly the correspondence between the GWR coefficients and changes in aggregate Democratic support is not complete (note, for example, the larger positive effects of the P roportion Democratic t−1
x P roportion Republican t−1 interaction in portions of Texas and New Mexico where spatial autocorrelation was actually below the mean). However, the maps in Figure 2 display the spatial nonstationarity in the effects of prior Democratic and Republican support on aggregate Democratic change in 1928 and indicate the role that this spatial nonstationarity played in shaping the political geography of voting in this election.
In addition to the voting variables, demographic variables also influenced aggregate Democratic change in 1928. Proportion Foreign Born had a positive effect on Democratic change in more than half of local electorates in the country and a negative effect in nearly 30 percent of electorates. This raises a caveat to Key's (1955) Turning to changes in Democratic support between 1928 and 1932, we can see from Table 2 that prior Democratic voting continued to impede aggregate Democratic gains in most counties.
Likewise, prior Republican support and prior non-voting also impeded Democratic gains in 1932.
Thus, as in 1928, the main effects of prior partisan voting and prior non-participation were to impede movement to the Democrats in most of the country.
As in 1928, the interaction terms of P roportion Democratic t−1 x P roportion Republican t−1 and P roportion Democratic t−1 x P roportion Non-Voting t−1 had negative effects on aggregate Democratic change in more locales than they had positive effects in. However, the percentages of negative and positive effects were much closer in 1932 than in 1928. The latter interaction, for example, had negative effects in only slightly more counties than it had positive effects in.
Most importantly, the interaction term of P roportion Republican t−1 x P roportion Non- It is important to note that the measure of unemployment is from the 1930 census, a time at which unemployment rates were still considerably lower than their peaks in 1932 and 1933 (Smiley 1983) . It is also important to note, however, that Franklin Roosevelt did not campaign in 1932 on a program of active economic intervention at the levels that would occur under the New Deal; in fact, he advocated reducing federal expenditures during his 1932 campaign (Renshaw 1999, 338) . Faced with this choice, some of those citizens who were experiencing early levels of unemployment may have abstained. With aggregate data alone, it is impossible to determine which citizens were producing these aggregate effects. It is clear, however, that controlling for other factors, unemployment rates served to reduce, not increase support for Roosevelt in 1932.
The 1936 election evidences both some continuity and some change with the preceding elections. As in the earlier elections, the main effects of prior Democratic, Republican, and non-voting populations were negative. However, in Roosevelt's first re-election, the effects of the interaction terms including prior Democratic voting were fundamentally different in 1936 than in 1928 and 1932. In those elections, the interaction terms P roportion Democratic t−1
x P roportion Republican t−1 and P roportion Democratic t−1 x P roportion Non-Voting t−1 had more negative than positive effects on Democratic change. In 1936, this was not the case. 
Conclusion
To date, however, spatial analyses have been underapplied in the study of political realignments.
The results in this paper demonstrate the utility of the political geographic perspective on realignments, and, accordingly, the utility of spatial analyses for the study of these realignments.
The global and local Morans demonstrate a strong spatial structuring of voting during the New Deal realignment that is consistent with the political geographic conception of realignments.
Shifts in voting support were not spatially random, but rather, were geographically clustered in each of the elections examined. This paper's analysis also suggests that standard models in which independent variables are assumed to have globally invariant effects are likely to be inappropriate for modeling political behavior in a geopolitically diverse polity such as the United States. As the analysis demonstrates, standard global parameters do not accurately capture the diverse effects of prior voting behavior and demographics during the New Deal realignment. The Geographically Weighted Regressions demonstrate the significant geographic variation in the effects of these factors on voting behavior. In a polity in which sectionalism and localism have played important roles, this is as we should expect. The analysis suggests the utility of a modeling approach such as GWR that incorporates the spatial nonstationarity in the sources of political behavior in the United States.
The effects of the interactions between partisan and non-voting populations highlight the potential for significant social interaction and contextual effects during political realignments.
Particularly interesting is how these effects varied over time. Prior to the Great Depression, : 1928, 1932, 1936 1928 1932 1936 Democratic Change
Above the mean and neighbors above the mean Above the mean and neighbors below the mean Below the mean and neighbors above the mean Below the mean and neighbors below the mean Not Significant 
